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ABSTRACT
Whenever people use language, they participate in valuation
practices, i.e. they give value to themselves as well as to others.
To account for the construction of social inequality through
discursive valuation practices, discourse theorists need Marxist
theory and Marxists need discourse theory. By going from the
early Marx to the late Foucault, I will revisit Marx’s value theory in
light of practice-oriented approaches to social inequality. I will
discuss examples from two distinct arenas, the monopolization of
attention by populist leaders and the academic star system, both
of which are accounted for in terms of the accumulation of
discursive capital. This perspective asks how the value of subject
positions is constructed and hierarchies between them are
established in discursive practices. Investigating the construction
of valuable subject positions in discourse communities, this
perspective attempts to overcome the traditional division
between language, the economic and the social. Discourse not
only represents value and the social order but, through
representation, it also contributes to constituting the social as a
hierarchical world of more or less valued subject positions.
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Discourse theorists need Marxist social theory and Marxists need discourse theory,
especially since discourse and communication have become central in contemporary
capitalism.1 While many Marxist theorists (Jameson, 1991; Marazzi, 1994; Sum & Jessop,
2013) no longer distinguish between a non-discursive base and a discursive superstruc-
ture, classical strands in Discourse Studies, such as early ‘French’ Discourse Analysis and
some developments in Critical Discourse Analysis, tend to conceive language as a practice
determined by a socioeconomic structure before and outside language. While I want to
remind discourse researchers that the lines between language and the economy cannot
be easily drawn, I will critically interrogate the reception Marx has seen in Discourse
Studies as a structuralist theorist of the social.2
By going from the early Marx to the late Foucault, I will revisit Marx’s theory of value in
light of discursive and practice-oriented approaches to social inequality. I will discuss
examples from two arenas in terms of the valuation of subject positions, namely the populist
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logics of scandalization in political discourse and the star system in academic discourse. Both
populist ‘fake news’ and ‘scientific facts’ can be seen as a product of discursive valuation
practices. To account for these phenomena, one needs to ask how discourse participants
obtain visibility and recognition in their communities. By conceptualizing language use as
a practice of valuating subject positions, this perspective attempts to overcome the tra-
ditional division between linguistic and economic activity (cf. Borrelli, 2018) and, more gen-
erally, between base and superstructure. While asking how discursive capital is produced,
accumulated and distributed among the members of a discourse community, this perspec-
tive studies discourse which not only represents social, political and economic hierarchies of
more and less valued subject positions but, through representation, also constitutes them.
Marx in discourse studies
It has been commonplace to play out a ‘traditional’ Marx, who is in favour of social deter-
minism, against a Marx more open to ‘poststructuralist’ or ‘pragmatic’ readings which
recognize the semiotic, linguistic and symbolic dimensions of the social. One can
perhaps see the impact of the latter version in Baudrillard (1972), Laclau and Mouffe
(1985) or Habermas (1992). Inspired by the linguistic turn, these post-Marxist social theor-
ists have accounted for dilemmas of aesthetic and political representation in contempor-
ary society (such as media, culture, discrimination etc., Spivak, 1988), which had seen
insufficient attention in earlier Marxist social theory.
From a post-Marxist perspective, the Marx of traditional Marxism needs to be problema-
tized in two ways. Post-Marxists criticize a certain Marxist tradition for conceptualizing the
social as a closed, constituted antagonism where every position has a clear hierarchical
value. And they reject the Marxist idea of language and society as two separate but inter-
related areas. By making the case for a linguistic turn, these theorists have rejected such
deterministic ideas and pointed out the effects of language use for the social (Angermuller,
2015, 83ff.).
Yet while making the case for a linguistic turn, they risk losing sight of the social or redu-
cing it to a secondary problem, to an effect of contingent political acts (Laclau, Habermas)
or to an unbound play of semiotic representations (Baudrillard). Rather than throwing the
baby out with the bathwater and giving up on social theory, I would suggest that there is
a problem with a specific idea of the social, namely with the social understood as a
closed structure (i.e. ‘society’, which Marx never advocated). While structuralist models of
the social have informed classical strands in Discourse Studies, it is time to recall the practice
theory that one can find in Marx, perhaps especially in the early Marx (e.g. Marx & Engels,
1963, 1988). The centrality of the concept of practice in Marx is already apparent in the
famous first thesis on Feuerbach, where reality is conceived of as ‘sensuous human activity,
practice’ (Marx, 2010, p. 3). People practically ‘make their own history’ albeit not ‘just as they
please in circumstances they choose for themselves’ (Marx, 2002, p. 19). Unfortunately, Marx
is not very specific about what are ‘human’ practices, which may evoke the humanism one
finds in his early writings. Yet there can be little doubt that human practices would include
discourse, i.e. the social uses that people make of language. Therefore, discourse theorists
who problematize structuralist notions of the social should find inspiration in Marx’s prax-
eological views of the social as a hierarchical space of positions which is constituted practi-
cally (cf. the pragmatist perspective on valuation from Boltanski & Esquerre, 2017).
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To insist with Marx on the practices constituting the social does not mean that one con-
siders humanbeings as autonomous, free from social constraints. On the contrary, the ques-
tion is how their practices are shaped and constrained by the conditions which they help
bring forth in their practices. In his analysis of contemporary capitalism, Marx focuses on
a specific practice of valuation: labour, especially labour in the industrial sector. Through
their labour, the participants of economic activities produce commodities, which have a
certain (exchange) value. The value of these commodities is not an inherent property.
Rather, the value of commodities expresses a societal relationship, i.e. the socially necessary
time given the technological possibilities at a certain moment of socioeconomic develop-
ment. This ismost poignantly presented inMarx’s chapter on The Fetishismof the Commodity
and its Secret (Marx, 1990, 163ff.), where, in the practice of exchange, ‘the relationships
between the producers’ take on the inverted formof a ‘social relation between the products
of labor’ (Marx, 1990, p. 164).
Most modes of production in the past – and capitalism is no exception – have been
built on the crucial asymmetry between the many who produce value – those doing
socially necessary work – and the few who appropriate the products of labour and own
the means of production. As a result of economic activities which are not necessarily coor-
dinated, the participants of the economic process help produce and reproduce a class
structure in which the bourgeois accumulate value and the workers remain bereft of
the riches produced in society.
Many Marxist theorists have restricted the generation and distribution of value to activi-
ties in the industrial sector. Yet what could be the justification for excluding the many
things people do, say and think outside contractual employment? Indeed, from a valuation
perspective (Lamont, 2012), discursive practices, too, need to be seen as a source of value
no matter whether they are produced during or outside working hours. Indeed, whenever
one mobilizes text and talk, one engages in a practice of valuation in the social world.
Through language, discourse participants not only negotiate the value of the ideas they
express but they also valuate what is perhaps most existential for all, i.e. their subject pos-
itions – the identities and roles, the sets of labels and categories that allow people to be
recognized as members of a discourse community. As opposed to a philosophical under-
standing of subjectivity, humans do not have a timeless, universal subjectivity. As Althusser
(2003) argues with recourse to Lacanian psychoanalysis, they become subjects by entering
a discourse in which they occupy subject positions. While for Althusser a subject position is
embedded in a rather static symbolic structure (like a system of names that are given to
and imposed on a newborn), Foucault defends the more dynamic idea that subject pos-
itions are constructed in discursive processes and practices involving many members of
a community over time.
Not all subject positions have the same value. Subject positions can have a subjective
value for discourse participants who relate to them through proximity or distance, posi-
tively or negatively (e.g. ‘my grandmother’; ‘a repugnant person’). Linguists may think of
the problems of deixis, modality, evaluation and stance here (e.g. Chilton, 2014). But
subject positions can also have an objective value which is recognized in larger commu-
nities and in institutions (e.g. the member of parliament, who has been elected; the cele-
brated football star). In this context, one may evoke macro-sociological work on the
construction of social reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). While Marx distinguished
between use and exchange value to capture the subjective and objective value of
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goods, he did not yet recognize the role of language as a practice of valuating human and
non-human actants, material and non-material things. Through language, the value sub-
jects have in a discourse community is encoded, displayed and established. And in discur-
sive dynamics that can involve large populations, some people, ideas and things can gain a
value that no member of a discourse community can ignore.
Enunciative pragmatics provides a linguistic perspective on discursive valuation of subject
positions. From the point of view of enunciative pragmatics, discourse mobilizes utterances,
which are linguistically encoded speech acts (Angermuller, 2014, 54ff.). Utterances are the
smallest linguistic units that members use to negotiate their positions in the community
and in the social space. Formed from a subject (e.g. ‘The wall…’) and a predicate (e.g. ‘ …
is white.’), utterances always define a locutor (a deictic centre), which constitutes the position
from where the speech act is performed at a certain point in time and space vis-à-vis other
speakers. Through utterances, language users show their and others’ positions in discourse.
Hence, to understand the meaning of ‘The wall is white’, language users need to define the
locutor, which represents one of the points of view mobilized by the utterance (Ducrot,
1984, chapter 8). ‘The wall is not white’, for instance, implies two points of view, one of
which (L[ocutor]) holding ‘The wall is white’ at a distance and the other (A[llocutor]) taking
in charge what is negated by L. By processing polyphonic utterances, discourse participants
participate in positioning and valuating practices of members in a discourse community.
The positions participants construct through language in spontaneous encounters can
be ephemeral but they are crucially important for the sense of identity discourse partici-
pants can have (cf. Harré & Davies, 1990). As many participate in discursive positioning
practices in large populations through written texts over a long time, highly valuable pos-
itions can emerge from the interplay of the many discourse participants (cf. Laclau &
Mouffe, 1985). Once such subject positions are established and once they are perceived
as ‘real’ in a discourse community, they have an objective value that others can, and some-
times have to, relate to. All participants are involved in producing hierarchies between
those who occupy more and less valued subject positions (and excluding the many
who occupy no position, Rancière, 1995). Discourse, therefore, is not a neutral medium
that allows people to simply express what they want to say. It is a practice that responds
to the existential question ‘Who am I for others?’
This is the point where one should consider praxeological conceptions of discourse as
doing subject positions in a context of power and inequality. While praxeological ideas
have informed sociolinguistics, linguistic anthropology and many areas of qualitative
social research, one should not forget the critical theories of practice from the early
Marx to the late Foucault. Foucault hardly cites Marx and when he does so, one often
sees him criticize what he perceives as Marx’s economism. Foucault does not share a teleo-
logical vision of history. Nor does he see a single type of practice, the ‘economy’, as the
fundamental, causal base that explains the social order. Foucault points out the crucial
importance of subjectivity for practices of governing, notably free, entrepreneurial subjec-
tivity for the neoliberal governmentality. And he insists on discourse as a practice that
coordinates social behaviour of large populations and constitutes social inequalities
through subject positions (Foucault, 2004). Yet just like Marx, Foucault grounds knowledge
in a social and historical context and asks how knowledge is mobilized in the making of
social hierarchies. In many ways, Foucault extends Marx’s intuitions concerning the
nexus of valuation and the social order.
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While Marxist theorists often concentrate on the impact of external economic and pol-
itical interests on scientific knowledge or public deliberation (Fairclough, 1989; Slaughter &
Leslie, 1997), the accumulation of discursive capital within discourse communities has
been given insufficient attention (but see Bourdieu, 1982; Reitz, 2017). As a practice of
valuation through language, discourse needs to be seen as an important source of
value in the social world. For just like commodities, whose (exchange) value is a function
of the socially necessary labour time, subject positions become valuable by absorbing the
time and energy of the members of the discourse community. As a result, some subject
positions gain more (exchange) value than others. And one can often observe a transfer
of value from the many discourse workers (who talk only about others) to the few dis-
course ‘capitalists’ (who are talked to and about).
Processes of value transfer and accumulation do not have to be organized strategically
by powerful actors (even though they often are). Nor do they have to replicate a consti-
tuted social structure of power (even though they often do). Discourses may indeed
operate under conditions of perfect ‘freedom’ (i.e. where nobody follows any command,
script or law) and still engender extreme hierarchies between those who get recognition
and those who do not. If some participants occupy dominant subject positions and others
do not, they usually benefit from a redistribution of value from the many invisible dis-
course participants towards the few who occupy highly valued subject positions.
Indeed, the highly valuable subject positions of the community result from the time
and energy dispensed by all members of the community, most of whom unheard and
nameless, while some manage to appropriate the few subject positions which absorb
the discursive labour of the many. This is what I call the accumulation of discursive
capital in a discourse community.
Whereas Marx makes out the industrial factory as a locus of capitalist exploitation, the
accumulation of discursive value through highly recognized subject positions does not
require discourse labourers to sell their labour force to an institution, at least not comple-
tely. Many academics can be considered as semi-autonomous producers working in hybrid
employment contracts where contractualized work for an institution (e.g. as a teacher) is
combined with a quasi entrepreneurial component (e.g. as a researcher who produces for
a market of symbolic goods, a disciplinary community where he/she publishes in his/her
own name). If, technically, the members of such discourse communities (such as in art, the
media or the liberal professions) do not have to be exploited by a surplus-extracting
organization, they are nevertheless subject to massive de- and revaluations of their
subject positions in the spontaneous dynamics of discourse. In these arenas of semi-
free-lance value production, the relationships of production are no longer those of the
industrial age (think of new challenges like intellectual property rights). ‘Late capitalism’
(Jameson, 1991), ‘cognitive capitalism’ (Boutang, 2012), ‘mental capitalism’ (Franck,
2007) or the ‘knowledge-based economy’ (Sum & Jessop, 2013) capture the profoundly
discursive nature of these areas in contemporary capitalism.
Two examples from political and academic discourse: making ‘fake news’
and ‘scientific truths’
I will now come to how hierarchies of subject positions are constructed in two social
arenas – firstly, in the way that political actors boost their visibility in political discourse
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through strategic scandalization (as has been theorized by CDA scholars) and, secondly, in
the way academic recognition for valued knowledge is redistributed among academic
actors, the ‘Matthew effect’ (Merton, 1968), also known as the academic star system.
Both examples, the production of ‘fake news’ and ‘scientific truths’, will be accounted
for through the same mechanism of discursive capital accumulation. By applying a sym-
metrical explanation, I will give an example of how discourse research following the
Strong Programme (Angermuller, 2018) can account for discourses critically no matter
whether one considers them as true or false.
My first example is right-wing populist parties and movements, whose rise one can
observe in many Western countries since the late 1970s (Richardson, 2004), e.g. Front
National in France, anti-Islam propagandists in the Netherlands, UKIP and Brexit in the
UK, the Tea Party and Trump in the U.S. and, more recently, AfD in Germany. Such
parties turn around highly visible subject positions constructed in public political discourse
through a mechanism which Wodak (2014) has described as a strategy of discursive pro-
vocation. The textbook example comes from Austria, where FPÖ has applied this strategy
for more than 30 years and refined to such a degree that it got them into power repeat-
edly. Populist discourse always follows the same script of scandalization, which begins
with a right-winger saying something (i.e. Trump: ‘We need a wall to keep Mexican
rapists out.’) which then creates outrage in the public sphere (and also some applause
from Facebook posts and FoxNews). Commentators from the liberal and left-wing spec-
trum frantically react until the maligned populist declares that he or she was not racist,
that he or she never meant to say that all Mexicans are rapists (which indeed he or she
may never have said) and that he or she apologized if he or she had hurt anybody.
Public interest then subsides until the next provocation from the populist tests and
redraws the limits of the morally acceptable by starting another circle (e.g. Trump announ-
cing to ban people from ‘Muslim’ and ‘shithole’ countries to enter the U.S.). One can
observe that populists typically reject being held accountable for what is said (they
never say that it is they who claim Mexicans are rapists). However, in recurrent loops of
scandalization and denial, they monopolize visibility in the political space while others
remain without a voice. Hence, over time, the ‘Trump’ subject position has grown from
a media celebrity (articulating socially recognized labels such as ‘New Yorker’, ‘real
estate entrepreneur’, ‘billionaire’, ‘beauty pageant contest organizer’, ‘participant in The
Apprentice’…) to a character with a distinct personality and style (‘tweets against adver-
saries’, ‘calls himself genius’, ‘gropes women’, uses words like ‘bigly’) and with a political
profile (‘Republican’, ‘Mexican wall’, ‘protectionism’, ‘Putin-friendly’…). It is from such a dis-
cursively constructed subject position, which others cannot ignore, that political ideas are
imposed on others.
Such dynamics do not take place in a power-free space. While some discourse partici-
pants can mobilize more economic resources than others (e.g. billionaires pushing for tax
cuts), populist discourses are often fuelled by the energies and affects that come from the
misrecognition of the subject status of many voters, sometimes caused by social and econ-
omic deprivation or a crisis that reinforces the sentiment of ‘being left behind’. In the case
of the Trump election, Trumpist political subjectivity (‘Make America Great Again!’) appar-
ently appealed to voters from rural areas with low educational degrees more so than from
urban areas with high formal education. Such voters turned out to be especially responsive
to the promise of voice, recognition and agency. And the social demographics show that
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they appropriate the white, male, nationalist subject positions articulated in Trump dis-
course according to their social, cultural and economic situation. By mobilizing a specific
mix of economic, political, cultural, religious and symbolic resources, political discourses
bring forth subject positions which allow millions of voters to be counted and recognized
as subjects in discourse.
One cannot account for discourse only in terms of the ideas that it conveys. It is not
sophisticated knowledge or a ‘true’ account of reality that explains discursive activity.
Rather, discourse turns around the social subject positions that the participants tacitly
or overtly compete for. Discourse is a struggle over subjectivity as a result of which
social hierarchies are sometimes reinforced, sometimes mitigated. The Trump brand is
an example of extreme concentration of discursive capital in one subject position which
results from many participating in media discourse no matter whether they share
Trump’s ideas or not. ‘Trump’, in other words, is the product of thousands of journalists
and millions of anonymous discourse participants, of his right-wing fans as well as of
his left and liberal detractors, who all participate in boosting his subject position in the
exclusive, competitive and hierarchical space of mass media discourse (this includes some-
body like me, the author of this article, who regrettably contributes to the Trump phenom-
enon by discussing it as an example here even though I have no political sympathy
whatsoever with Trump). Therefore, the ‘Trump’ subject position absorbs the discursive
labour of the many participants of media discourse while resonating with the (devalued)
subject positions of his voters (cf. Stavrakakis, Katsambekis, Nikisianis, Kioupkiolis, &
Siomos, 2017).
The second example illustrates the concentration of value in academic discourse. If the
Trump presidency is an example for somebody who has attained a position of power
through what, from the point of view of many scientific observers, are ‘lies’, ‘narcistic
self-celebration’ and ‘hate speech’, academic discourse, too, can be cited as an example
of a discourse where actors occupy positions of power. Academic researchers engage in
struggles over ‘truths’ in order to establish ‘scientific facts’. By applying the principle of
symmetry following the Strong Programme, I consider both scientific ‘truths’ and populist
‘post-truths’ as products of discursive processes and practices of members of a discourse
community. Given that populism and science is often perceived to be in opposition to
each other, this may be a counterintuitive and surprising claim. However, acknowledging
that both truths and post-truths result from the same discursive mechanism does not
mean that one accepts ‘that they are all the same’, that their claims have the same norma-
tive value. On the contrary, it is important to see that by engaging in academic discursive
practices, academics give value to certain knowledges (which are made true as it were).
And by defending the value of scientific truths that one understands to be discursively
constructed, one can criticize populist ideas as lies, which are accepted in some, especially
in non-academic communities (e.g. NRA supporters, white evangelicals). Therefore, while
the emerging hierarchies between subject positions should be seen critically, they cannot
be criticized on the ground that some ideas are inherently true or false or that some actors
pursue good or bad intentions. Rather, the Strong Programme opts for immanent critique
(Herzog, 2016), for which discourses can be criticized only on the grounds of normative
criteria which are themselves a product of the discourses in question.
Whatever the ideas and intentions academics want to convey through academic dis-
course, they are always engaged in social practices of constructing subject positions. A
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case in point is the practice of academic citation in academic communities, which can
bring forth strong hierarchies between few academic stars and many un- or misrecognized
academics (Angermuller, 2009). The reputational and institutional hierarchies which keep
being reproduced through ongoing, spontaneous valuation practices of academics are
also known as the ‘Matthew effect’: ‘For whoever has will be given more, and they will
have an abundance’. Just like populist scandalization, which involves populist and anti-
populist discourse participants, academics produce and reproduce the academic star
system in their everyday discursive valuation practices no matter how they relate to
those they cite. It is difficult for academics not to participate in this game (Angermuller,
2013b). It is by citing and being cited that they recognize the value of others and also
find their own value recognized by others (Hyland, 1999). As a discursive micro-practice
of valuation, academic discourse not only represents the value that people see in a
researcher but through citation, the value of research and researchers is also constituted.
As Marx has pointed out in his writings (e.g. Marx, 1990, 138ff), such value is relational – it
only exists within the relations to all other citations. By using utterances in their talks and
publications, researchers express subjective relationships of proximity and distance to
other researchers (Hamann, 2016). While the scientific system of producing and distribut-
ing values among participants is a powerful incentive for all participants to boost up
knowledge claims and produce scientific truths, one can observe the emergence of
strong inequalities between the many who cite and the few who are cited.
As a result of such dynamics which nobody entirely controls, the value of some subject
positions is boosted while many fail to get any recognition at all. Academic discourse,
therefore, can be seen as a process in which participants value others in the hope of
being valued by others and thus reproduce a hierarchy between dominant and dominated
groups (Maeße, 2013). In these processes, which involve many participants over long time,
subject positions absorb the discursive labour that all academics dispense to be part of the
game. Few academic positions make a difference to large numbers while many positions
make no difference to anybody. And the hierarchy between the few positions that absorb
the discursive labour of the many and the many that fail to make any difference at all is not
only symbolic (in Bourdieu’s sense). Ongoing discursive valuation practices in everyday
academic life contribute to reproducing institutional hierarchies between status groups
which can go hand in hand with strong financial salary spreads between the top and
the bottom. Academic discourse is not only about the ‘soft’ hierarchies of reputation
but also about ‘hard’ institutional and economic power (Angermuller, 2017).
Both populist scandalization and the Matthew effect are systematic features of pol-
itical and academic discourses where many members participate in the discursive con-
struction of hierarchies. Inequalities which are constructed in discourse are not only
about knowledge; they do not exist just in the heads of those who take part in dis-
course. Discursive positioning practices are material (Beetz & Schwab, 2017) in that
they divide large populations into dominant and dominated subject positions. Yet
the heterogeneity of valuation practices needs to be stressed. Subjective value does
not always translate into objective value (one may value ideas that nobody else
values). Institutionalized value hierarchies (e.g. academic status or elected office) do
not necessarily replicate the ephemeral but equally important value hierarchies con-
structed in more spontaneous discursive dynamics (such as reputation or celebrity).
While ‘soft’ hierarchies (e.g. Trump’s branded subject position or academic reputation)
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can turn into a ‘hard’ asset with political and economic power (a presidency or a pro-
fessorship), not all value can be broken down to the same scale (such as prices set on
markets or other number-based techniques of valuation, see the critique of numeroc-
racy in Angermuller & Maeße, 2015). Discourse participants need to find practical sol-
utions for the difficult task of negotiating the value of subject positions without
there being a common set of valuation criteria. Hence, the challenge for discourse
researchers is to account for the heterogeneity of valuation practices which can but
do not have to be subject to governmental practices of commensurabilization (e.g.
evaluation schemes applied to large academic populations, Angermuller, 2013a).
Discourse research as reflexive critique
I will conclude by recapitulating what it means to consider discourse as a practice of valua-
tion. By critically interrogating the structuralist reception of Marx that predominates in
some strands of Discourse Studies, I have questioned the top-down view on constituted
social structures and inequality. Instead, one will prefer bottom-up views on the processes
and practices of doing subject positions in the social. Power and inequality are not simply
imposed on discourse participants from above; the question is how power and inequality
are done in the ongoing discursive practices of all members of a discourse community.
Against this background, discourse needs to be seen as a valuation practice that
. is not only instrumental in representing value but also constitutive of it;
. cannot be accounted for by the ideas, intentions and theories the actors have about
their practices. Truths, post-truths and untruths need to be explained in terms of the
hierarchical social order that these practices produce and reproduce;
. goes beyond a narrowly economic understanding as it also includes the discursive prac-
tices of using language that attribute value to people, things and ideas;
. produces and reproduces material hierarchies between more and less valued members
of a discourse community.
The world we live in today looks massively different from the world 200 years ago, when
Marx was born. Yet Discourse Studies can still gain from his seminal explorations of the
nexus of value and social inequality. And Discourse Studies can point out the crucial
role of language as an ongoing practice of constituting the social through representation.
The objectives of Marx’s theoretical project were historical: he wanted to account for capit-
alism as a historical mode of production. In this contribution, I discussed discourse as a
valuation practice more generally and future research will need to look into more specific
regimes of accumulation such as the advent of social media in political discourse and the
managerialisation of higher education These historical changes have meant new chal-
lenges for discourse research whose consequences still need to be spelled out. Going
beyond the structuralist division between language, the economic and the social, a prax-
eological Marx/Foucault view on discourse will insist on two points in particular:
Firstly, the value attached to subject positions expresses a social relationship in the dis-
course community. Subject positions do not have an inherent value. Rather, their value is
the product of the social practices and processes among all members who participate in
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constituting and establishing it. Therefore, the value of any given subject position needs to
be related to the value that is created by all members of the discourse community.
Secondly, by using language, discourse participants contribute to producing and
reproducing an unequal social order through the accumulation of discursive capital.
In discursive dynamics among many participants, value, which is produced by the
many, is concentrated in the hands of the few. This process is usually neither intended
nor reflected upon by the language users. While discourse participants usually use
language to achieve an intended goal (i.e. express an idea), they are mostly unaware
of the redistribution of value that takes place from those who produce it to those
who take credit for it.
Discourse, therefore, is understood to be a source of value and not just a means to rep-
resent value. It takes time, energy and many non-linguistic resources to use language and
to engage in discourse, which is why discourse creates value and does not only represent
the social as a hierarchical world of more or less valued people, things and ideas. No
research which tries to account for valuation processes in the social world can be
neutral as it participates in making people, things, ideas valuable no matter how ‘objective’
it intends to be. Just like any other discourse, discourse research, too, contributes to creat-
ing and establishing truths and realities. It cannot but have critical effects on its objects
and intervene in the discourses that it analyzes. Therefore, one should encourage dis-
course researchers to engage in reflexive critique and to recognize that theirs is a struggle
over truths which involves those who engage in it (the actors), those who account for it
(the observers) and those who intervene (the clinicians, cf. Parker, 2014).
Discursive critique should be reflexive of the ‘scientific truths‘ it mobilizes to question
‘populist lies’. Hence, one can and should admit that all truths are discursively constructed.
Yet in no way does one have to accept that any idea can be true because somebody wants
it to be true. All truths do not have the same subjective and objective value and nobody
can escape from the practices of valuation, the processes and dynamics of attributing
value to people, things, ideas, in which one is caught up with whenever one uses
language. There is no outside the discursive struggles over true and valuable knowledge.
Through language, one always participates in valuation. And when we enter discourse, we
should always reflect on what is perhaps the most existential good for us all, namely to be
in a position of saying, thinking and doing things which we value.
Notes
1. I would like to thank Johannes Beetz, Benno Herzog, Kolja Lindner and Juliane Reinecke for
their valuable comments.
2. One can mention early French Discourse Analysis, which asks how utterances relate to the
social conditions (i.e. ‘class struggle’, Haroche, Henry, & Pêcheux, 1971). A similar correlation
between the linguistic and the social domains can be observed in Critical Discourse Analysis,
which places the ‘text’ (i.e. linguistic expressions) within the ‘interaction’ (i.e. practices), both of
them being surrounded by the ‘context’ (i.e. society and its institutions, Fairclough, 1989,
p. 25). The structuralism of early French and Critical Discourse Analysis has been challenged
by pragmatic and interactional strands of research, which consider the social context as a prac-
tical achievement of those who use language rather than something that can be given by
social theorists. A longer discussion of the structuralist heritage in these classical approaches
and their limits can be found elsewhere (Angermuller, 2018).
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